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A CASE STUDY REGARDING THE
ONGOING DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE
FEDERAL CIRCUIT AND THE SUPREME






OR much of its existence, the Federal Circuit was largely left alone
to chart the evolution of patent law, with little or no effective re-
view by the Supreme Court.' But as many commentators have
noted, that era of relative neglect by the Supreme Court is behind us, as
the Supreme Court has increasingly reviewed-and frequently disagreed
with-the Federal Circuit's patent-law decisions in the past decade.2 The
Supreme Court's newfound interest in patent law has prompted a range
of reactions (many of them unfavorable) from participants in the patent
system, including commentators, patent lawyers, and the Federal Circuit
* Thomas G. Hungar is a partner at Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP and co-chair of
the firm's Appellate and Constitutional Law Practice Group. He previously served as Dep-
uty Solicitor General of the United States and in that capacity represented the United
States as amicus curiae in KSR v. Teleflex.
** Rajiv Mohan is a law clerk at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.
1. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the
Bar of Patents, 2002 Sup. C-r. REv. 273, 276-77 (2002).
2. In the past decade, the Supreme Court has disagreed with the Federal Circuit's
legal analysis in numerous cases. See Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics,
133 S. Ct. 2017 (2013); Caraco Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670
(2012); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2011);
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011); Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S.
Ct. 3218 (2010); Quanta Comp., Inc. v. LG Elec., Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); KSR Int'l Co. v.
Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007);
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007); eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange
LLC, 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Merck KGaA v. Integra LifeSciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005);
Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoki Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722 (2002). It has
agreed with the Federal Circuit's legal analysis in several other cases. See Bowman v. Man-
santo Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761 (2013); Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690 (2012); Bd. of Trustees
of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys., Inc. 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011);
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011).
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judges themselves.3 Chief Judge Rader has described the perception of a
"culture clash" between the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court, with the
former preferring rules and the latter favoring discretion.4
Given the relatively unfettered authority to resolve important ques-
tions of patent law that the Federal Circuit has enjoyed until recent years,
combined with the less-than-favorable reviews greeting the Supreme
Court's recently enhanced role in such cases, one might expect the Fed-
eral Circuit to take steps to minimize the impact of the Supreme Court's
incursions into patent law-not by brazenly disobeying Supreme Court
precedent, of course, but perhaps by subtly limiting the precedent's reach
and negating its implications. While a complete analysis of this question
would require comprehensive evaluation of the extent to which the Fed-
eral Circuit has fully implemented all of the Supreme Court's twenty-first
century patent-law precedents, a task well beyond the scope of this paper,
we have taken a first step in that direction by examining the Federal Cir-
cuit's response to the Supreme Court's 2007 foray into the law of obvi-
ousness in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.5
KSR marked the Supreme Court's first substantive pronouncement on
the law of obviousness in more than thirty years. The Court's decision
rejected the rigid "teaching, suggestion, motivation" test for obviousness
that had come to prevail in the Federal Circuit during that period. The
rejection of so entrenched a doctrine is bound to prompt a vigorous re-
sponse one way or another. Roughly six years have passed since KSR was
decided, providing us a meaningful opportunity to analyze that response.
We conclude that the Federal Circuit has indeed implemented KSR in
substantial respects, but not fully, such that KSR still holds potential for
further change in the law of obviousness. The Federal Circuit's response
to KSR also helps illustrate the culture clash described by Chief Judge
Rader. The Supreme Court in KSR stressed the need for flexibility and
discretion, but the Federal Circuit responded in part by attempting to
craft rules that simplify decision making and, at least in theory, provide
3. (Former) Judge Gajarsa has stated that patent law rules must "be clear, concise
and in some cases rigid. The Supreme Court does not like rigid." Erin Geiger Smith, Ex-
Federal Circuit Judge Sees Patent Tensions with Supreme Court, THOMSON REUTERS (Mar.
14, 2013), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2013/03_-_MarchlEx-Fed
eralCircuit-judge sees-patent tensionswith-Supreme-Court/. Judge Rader has said,
"The problem is that the Supreme Court is not putting the language of the statute in the
proper context." Ryan Davis, Rader Calls Out High Court's 'Activism' In IP Law, LAw360
(Jan. 22, 2013, 8:11 PM), http://www.1aw360.com/articles/408846/rader-calls-out-high-court-
s-activism-in-ip-law. By contrast, Judge Dyk has stated that "[hiostility to Supreme Court
review is, in my view, misguided." Timothy B. Dyk, Does the Supreme Court Still Matter?,
57 AM. U. L. REv. 763, 763 (2007); see also Paul R. Gugliuzza, Rethinking Federal Circuit
Jurisdiction, 100 GEO. L.J. 1437, 1441 (2012); Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures,
120 YALE L.J. 2 (2010); Gene Quinn, Killing Industry: The Supreme Court Blows Mayo v.
Prometheus (Mar. 20, 2012, 1:44 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/20/supreme-
court-mayo-v-prometheusid=22920/.
4. Gene Quinn, Chief Judge Rader on the Supreme Court and Judge Posner,
IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 17, 2013, 12:07 PM), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/03/17/chief-
judge-rader-on-the-supreme-court-and-judge-posnerid=37620/.
5. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
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predictability. Ultimately though, that aspect of the Federal Circuit's re-
sponse to KSR is likely self-defeating.
The Article is organized as follows: Part I offers a brief sketch of the
obviousness doctrine through KSR. Part II examines the many respects in
which the Federal Circuit has implemented KSR in accordance with the
Supreme Court's guidance. Part III discusses the remaining respects in
which the Federal Circuit has yet to fully implement KSR. Part IV sum-
marizes our conclusions.
I. OBVIOUSNESS THROUGH KSR
Section 103 of the Patent Act makes a claimed invention obvious and
hence unpatentable "if the differences between the claimed invention and
the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have
been obvious before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the claimed invention
pertains."6 The Supreme Court explained in Graham v. John Deere Co.
of Kansas City that the determination of obviousness involves a question
of law, but rests on several factual inquiries:
[T]he scope and content of the prior art are to be determined; differ-
ences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascer-
tained; and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art resolved.
Against this background, the obviousness or nonobviousness of the
subject matter is determined. Such secondary considerations as com-
mercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc.,
might be utilized. . . .7
Between Graham and KSR, the Federal Circuit developed its "teach-
ing, suggestion, or motivation" (TSM) test to provide a relatively bright-
line rule that would facilitate resolution of obviousness questions. Under
that test, a patent would be deemed obvious only if there existed "some
reason, suggestion, or motivation found in the prior art whereby a person
of ordinary skill in the field of the invention would make the combina-
tion."8 The court often applied the test rigidly. For example, the lack of a
specific teaching, suggestion, or motivation in the prior art could not "be
remedied" by "general conclusions about what is 'basic knowledge' or
'common sense' to one of ordinary skill in the art."9 Similarly, the court
would reject arguments that "one of ordinary skill in the art would have
been motivated to combine the references" in the absence of "specific
findings of fact" to that effect.' 0 After the Supreme Court granted certio-
rari in KSR, the Federal Circuit attempted to ameliorate some of the ri-
gidity of its test, refining it to include "consideration of common
6. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2006).
7. 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
8. In re Oetiker, 977 F.2d 1443, 1447 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
9. See In re Zurko, 258 F.3d 1379, 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
10. See In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994, 1001-02 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
2013] A Case Study 561
562 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 66
knowledge and common sense.""
KSR rejected the Federal Circuit's application of a rigid TSM test.12 In
the Supreme Court's view, the obviousness inquiry could not "be con-
fined by a formalistic conception of the words teaching, suggestion, and
motivation." 13 To the contrary, "[t]he diversity of inventive pursuits and
of modern technology counsels against limiting the analysis in this
way." 14 Along the way, the Court pointed out that the Federal Circuit
had erred by "deny[ing] recourse to common sense"' 5 in assuming "that a
person of ordinary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to
those elements of the prior art designed to solve the same problem," 16
and by concluding "that a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely
by showing that the combination was obvious to try."' 7 KSR also reaf-
firmed the "expansive and flexible" approach to obviousness laid out in
Graham.'8 The Court explained that "[a] person of ordinary skill is also a
person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton";19 that "[w]hen a work is
available in one field, design incentives and other market forces can
prompt variations of it"; 2 0 and that "[t]he combination of familiar ele-
ments according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it does
no more than yield predictable results."2 1
II. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT'S RESPONSE TO KSR
Facing criticism for its "constricted analysis," 22 "rigid approach," 23 and
"narrow conception of the obviousness inquiry," 24 the Federal Circuit has
sought to expand the obviousness inquiry. It has done so primarily by
adding flexibility to the TSM test and finding obvious the predictable use
of prior art elements according to their established functions.
A. THE FLEXIBLE TSM TEST
The Supreme Court clearly rejected a rigid TSM test,2 5 but left it for
the Federal Circuit to decide whether a more flexible version of a TSM
test could still be useful in helping guide (without controlling all aspects
of) the obviousness inquiry.26 The Federal Circuit has answered that
11. Dystar Textilfarben GmbH v. C.H. Patrick Co., 464 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir.
2006).
12. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 415 (2007).
13. Id. at 419.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 421.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 421 (internal quotation and citation omitted).
18. Id. at 415; see supra text accompanying note 7.
19. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
20. Id. at 417.
21. Id. at 416.
22. Id. at 421.
23. Id. at 415.
24. Id. at 419.
25. Id. at 415.
26. Id. at 418.
question affirmatively. In adhering to a more-flexible version of the TSM
test, the Federal Circuit has seized on the Supreme Court's observations
that the TSM test "captured a helpful insight"27 and that "it can be im-
portant to identify a reason that would have prompted a person of ordi-
nary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in the way the
claimed new invention does." 28
The modified TSM test is properly flexible in the Federal Circuit's view
because it draws on the expanded sources discussed in KSR: market
forces; design incentives; the "interrelated teachings of multiple patents";
"any need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of in-
vention and addressed by the patent"; and the background knowledge,
creativity, and common sense of the person of ordinary skill.2 9
Unlike the rigid TSM test followed before KSR, under the modified
version of the TSM test, "teaching, suggestions, or motivations need not
always be written references."30 The Federal Circuit has therefore drawn
on the following principles of KSR in relaxing and broadening the TSM
test: common sense, rehabilitating the person of ordinary skill, looking
beyond the probem the patentee tried to solve, design incentives and
market forces, scope of relevant prior art, and the combination of familiar
elements yielding predictable results.
B. COMMON SENSE
In KSR the Supreme Court explained that the rigid TSM test "den[ied]
factfinders recourse to common sense."31 The Federal Circuit has since
acknowledged that "common sense can be a source of the reasons to
combine or modify prior art to achieve the patented invention." 32 Under
the modified TSM test, then, a patented invention is obvious when "it is
simply a matter of common sense" to combine prior art elements "in or-
der to address the known problem" at issue.33 For example, when a
"known procedure" for bulk email delivery successfully delivers 95% of
emails, "common sense dictates" that one should repeat the procedure
27. Id. at 419; see also Takeda Chem. Indus. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd., 492 F.3d 1350,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2007) ("As long as the test is not applied as a 'rigid and mandatory'
formula, that test can provide 'helpful insight' to an obviousness inquiry.") (quoting KSR,
550 U.S. at 401).
28. KSR, 550 U.S. at 418; see also Hearing Components v. Shure, Inc., 600 F.3d 1357,
1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("[I]t may nevertheless be 'important to identify a reason that would
have prompted a person of ordinary skill in the relevant field to combine the elements in
the way the new invention does."') (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
29. Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
30. Ortho-McNeil Pharm., Inc. v. Mylan Labs., Inc., 520 F.3d 1358, 1365 (Fed. Cir.
2008).
31. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
32. Perfect Web Techs., Inc., 587 F.3d at 1328; see also Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616
F.3d 1231, 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2010) ("Thus, in appropriate cases, the ultimate inference as to
the existence of a motivation to combine references may boil down to a question of 'com-
mon sense,' appropriate for resolution on summary judgment or JMOL.").
33. Wyers, 616 F.3d. at 1241.
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"until success is achieved." 34
C. REHABILITATING THE PERSON OF ORDINARY SKILL
KSR rejected the Federal Circuit's narrow understanding of the person
of ordinary skill, instead describing that hypothetical individual as "a per-
son of ordinary creativity, not an automaton."35 Moreover, the Supreme
Court made clear that such persons will not "be led only to those ele-
ments of the prior art designed to solve the same problem."36 Pursuant to
this guidance from the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit has acknowl-
edged that the person of ordinary skill can close a "relatively small logical
gap between the prior art and the claim" at issue.37
D. LOOKING BEYOND THE PROBLEM THE PATENTEE TRIED TO
SOLVE
KSR held that the Federal Circuit erred by "holding that courts and
patent examiners should look only to the problem the patentee was trying
to solve."38 As a result, the Federal Circuit has subsequently recognized
that any known problem can provide a reason to combine prior art ele-
ments to form the claimed invention-" [t]his includes, but is not limited
to, the problem motivating the patentee." 39 Consequently, in rejecting an
argument that "the problem listed in the patent was insufficient motiva-
tion," the Federal Circuit looked beyond the patent to "evidence of
known problems and an obvious solution." 40
E. DESIGN INCENTIVES AND MARKET FORCES
KSR noted that "[w]hen a work is available in one field, design incen-
tives and other market forces can prompt variations of it."41 Thus, in
Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., the Federal Circuit held that a
speech "address[ing] the desirability" of the claimed combination ex-
pressed "demands known to the design community," and therefore "indi-
cat[ed] the obviousness of the claimed combination." 4 2
F. SCOPE OF RELEVANT PRIOR ART
KSR rejected the Federal Circuit's "assumption that a person of ordi-
nary skill attempting to solve a problem will be led only to those elements
of prior art designed to solve the same problem." 43 Post-KSR decisions of
the Federal Circuit have thus reinvigorated a line of pre-KSR precedent
34. Perfect Web Techs., Inc., 587 F.3d at 1330.
35. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
36. Id. at 420.
37. Scanner Techs. Corp. v. ICOS Vision Sys., 528 F.3d 1365, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
38. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420.
39. Norgren Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 699 F.3d 1317, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
40. Id. at 1327.
41. KSR, 550 U.S. at 417.
42. 532 F.3d 1318, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
43. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420.
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stating that prior art is relevant if it is either "from the same field of
endeavor, regardless of the problem addressed" or "not within the field
of the inventor's endeavor" but "reasonably pertinent to the particular
problem with which the inventor is involved."44 To be sure, KSR's obser-
vation that a "person of ordinary skill often will be able to fit the teach-
ings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle" suggests an even
broader scope for relevant prior art than that expressed in the Federal
Circuit's post-KSR test. 4 5 In most cases, however, the Federal Circuit's
application of the test does not appear to be unduly limiting. For exam-
ple, that court has considered prior art concerning folding beds relevant
to a claim for a folding treadmill. 46
In all these respects, the Federal Circuit has looked to KSR to inject
flexibility into the TSM test without-for the most part-reviving ele-
ments of the rigid TSM test.47 Moreover, the flexible TSM test appears to
be the dominant method of analysis post-KSR, suggesting that the Fed-
eral Circuit has not seen KSR as a drastic change to obviousness analy-
sis. 4 8 In most cases, the inquiry is broader, but structurally similar to the
pre-KSR inquiry.
G. THE COMBINATION OF FAMILIAR ELEMENTS YIELDING
PREDICTABLE RESULTS
The Federal Circuit has also frequently given effect to another aspect
of KSR, namely, its reinvigoration of a pair of Supreme Court prece-
dents-Anderson's Black-Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.49 and Sak-
raida v. Ag Pro, Inc. 50-that had fallen into disuse in the Federal Circuit.
These cases stand for the proposition that "[t]he combination of familiar
elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious when it
does no more than yield predictable results."5 ' In KSR, the Court ex-
plained that these cases "are illustrative -a court must ask whether the
improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art elements ac-
cording to their established functions."5 2
After KSR, the Federal Circuit has begun to ask this question. For in-
stance, in Agrizap, Inc. v. Woodstream Corp., the "asserted claims [for an
electronic rat and mouse trap] simply substitute[d] a resistive electrical
44. Comaper Corp. v. Antec, Inc., 596 F.3d 1343, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting In re
Clay, 966 F.2d 656, 658-59 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
45. KSR, 550 U.S. at 402.
46. See In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379-80 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
47. But see infra Part III.A.
48. See Emer Simic, The TSM Test is Dead! Long Live the TSM Test! The Aftermath
of KSR, What was all the Fuss About?, 37 APIPLA Q.J. 227, 230 (2009); Jason Rantanen,
The Federal Circuit's New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empirical Study 61 (U. Iowa
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 13-9, 2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract id=2210049.
49. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
50. 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
51. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416 (2007).
52. Id. at 417.
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switch for the mechanical pressure switch employed by the Gopher Zap-
per [another aptly-named apparatus for electrocuting pests]." 53 Conse-
quently, the Federal Circuit explained that this was "a textbook case of
when the asserted claims involve a combination of familiar elements ac-
cording to known methods that does no more than yield predictable re-
sults." 5 4 Similarly, in Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., the
Federal Circuit held obvious a claim that simply updated the mechanical
components of a toy with electronic components.55
When the court applies the Sakraida principle, it does so forcefully. To
avoid a holding of obviousness notwithstanding this principle, the paten-
tee usually must show an unexpected result or teaching away. As the Fed-
eral Circuit has explained, the "predictable result" described in KSR
refers to the expectation "that the combination would have worked for its
intended purpose ... . The opposite conclusion would follow, however, if
the prior art indicated that the invention would not have worked for its
intended purpose or otherwise taught away from the invention." 56
As applied by the Federal Circuit, the principle articulated in Sakraida
and Anderson's Black-Rock is distinct from the flexible TSM test and
provides an alternative method of establishing that a claimed invention is
obvious. For instance, the Federal Circuit did not look to the flexible
TSM test for guidance in Agrizap or Leapfrog Enterprises. Even so, the
court applies the Sakraida principle relatively infrequently. As these ex-
amples illustrate, thus far it appears that the Federal Circuit has applied it
primarily in certain types of cases: when a patent simply "accommo-
date[s] a prior art mechanical device . . . to modern electronics,"5 7 or
"adapt[s] existing electronic processes to incorporate modern internet
and web browser technology."58 It is unlikely, by contrast, that chemical
compounds are ever the predictable use of prior art elements according
to their established functions.59
III. THE UNFULFILLED ASPECTS OF KSR
As the foregoing overview demonstrates, in numerous respects the
Federal Circuit has sought to introduce into the obviousness analysis the
flexibility required by KSR. There can be no doubt that the inquiry is
more flexible than before and that the Federal Circuit has made substan-
tial strides in seeking to incorporate the teachings of KSR into its obvi-
ousness jurisprudence. Nonetheless, our review suggests that the Federal
53. 520 F.3d 1337, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
54. Id.
55. 485 F.3d 1157, 1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
56. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 567 F.3d 1314, 1326 (Fed.
Cir. 2009).
57. Leapfrog Enters., 485 F.3d at 1161.
58. Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
59. See, e.g., Takeda Chem. Indus. v. Alphapharm Pty., 492 F.3d 1350, 1357 (Fed. Cir.
2007) ("[I]t remains necessary to identify some reason that would have led a chemist to




Circuit has not yet fully implemented the logical implications of the Su-
preme Court's reasoning and holding in KSR. In particular, the Federal
Circuit's post-KSR decisions have not yet given full effect to KSR in three
respects: First, the Federal Circuit has sometimes treated the flexible
TSM test as necessary rather than as sufficient for establishing obvi-
ousness; second, the court has imposed the flexible TSM test on the dis-
tinct obvious-to-try doctrine; and third, the court has thus far failed to
recognize the full implications of the Supreme Court's elaboration of the
principle that obviousness is a question of law for the court.
A. TREATING THE FLEXIBLE TSM TEST AS NECESSARY TO
ESTABLISHING OBVIOUSNESS
Notwithstanding the guidance provided by the Supreme Court in KSR,
at times the Federal Circuit has treated its modified version of the flexible
TSM test as the sole means for establishing obviousness, instead of as
simply one helpful means of analyzing the obviousness inquiry. Thus, in
some cases the court has required a defendant "to present evidence that
one of ordinary skill in the art at the time of the invention would have
been motivated or found reason" to modify the prior art in the manner
claimed as a prerequisite to establishing obviousness.60 It has also re-
ferred to the "requisite motivation or suggestion to modify,"61 and it has
explained that "some kind of motivation must be shown from some
source, so that the jury can understand why a person of ordinary skill
would have thought of either combining two or more references or modi-
fying one to achieve the patented method."62
As this last statement suggests, the flexible TSM test has developed
into the Federal Circuit's primary (and sometimes exclusive) way of im-
plementing the nonobviousness requirement of § 103. Indeed, the court
had originally crafted the rigid TSM test "to resolve the question of obvi-
ousness with more uniformity and consistency." 6 3 And (at least at times)
it continues to strive for uniformity and consistency by mandating appli-
cation of the flexible TSM test. For the Federal Circuit, asking whether a
combination would have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill is too
vague to serve as a rule of law. And so it has sought to make the obvi-
ousness inquiry more rule-like and simpler to apply by requiring proof of
a reason to combine prior art references. While it is beyond dispute that
showing a reason to combine should suffice to establish prima facie obvi-
60. Amkor Tech., Inc. v. Int'l Trade Comm'n, 692 F.3d 1250, 1261 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
61. Takeda, 492 F.3d at 1356 (emphasis added).
62. Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (emphasis
added); see also Rentrop v. Spectranetics Corp., 550 F.3d 1112, 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (af-
firming jury instruction that there "must have been a motivation or suggestion to com-
bine," but that "[t]he motivation may arise from common knowledge, or common sense of
the person of ordinary skill in the art, without any specific hint or suggestion in a particular
reference").
63. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 407 (2007).
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ousness, requiring such proof as a mandatory prerequisite creates certain
difficulties and problems.
In the first place, if the flexible TSM test is treated as the only permissi-
ble method for establishing obviousness, the Federal Circuit will have re-
peated its mistake in adopting the rigid TSM test by departing from the
flexibility mandated by Graham and KSR. When a court implements a
broad legal standard with rules, it may well impose predictability, but at
the cost of "mild substantive distortion" of the underlying legal stan-
dard. 64 This distortion may be proper when the underlying legal principle
is "too vague to serve directly as [an] effective rule[] of law," but the
Supreme Court has rejected the idea that § 103 is too vague to serve di-
rectly as an effective rule of law.6 5 In Graham, the Court noted the "diffi-
culties in applying the nonobvious test," but found them "comparable to
those encountered daily by the courts in such frames of reference as neg-
ligence and scienter, and should be amenable to case-by-case develop-
ment." 66 And KSR rejected the Federal Circuit's attempt to "resolve the
question of obviousness with more uniformity and consistency," 6 7 opting
instead for the more "expansive and flexible approach" 68 set forth in
Graham. That the TSM test is now more flexible, in that the Federal Cir-
cuit has expanded the permissible means of showing a motivation (or rea-
son) to combine, does not resolve the underlying problem if the modified
test continues to operate as the sole test for obviousness. In that case, the
obviousness inquiry is not as flexible as Graham and the broad language
that § 103 contemplates.
Moreover, requiring a reason to combine as a prerequisite to an obvi-
ousness determination creates a substantial risk that Federal Circuit
panels will periodically relapse into applying what amounts to the
equivalent of the rigid TSM test rejected in KSR. Although such cases are
likely to be infrequent, there is reason to believe that they do exist. Con-
sider, for example, Star Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. 69
where it was well-known in the field that using heaters to dry tobacco
leaves in a barn produced undesirable chemical compounds. 70 This
cheaper method of curing emerged in the 1970s and took place in "direct-
fired barns," where combustion exhaust was mixed with the curing to-
bacco.71 Prior to the 1970s, tobacco was cured in "indirect-fired barns,"
where the tobacco was separated from the combustion exhaust.7 2 It was
further known that anaerobic conditions created by combustion gases
64. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1175, 1178
(1989).
65. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111 HARv. L.
REV. 54, 62 (1997).
66. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
67. 550 U.S. at 407.
68. Id. at 415.
69. 655 F.3d 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2011).





from the heaters produced those compounds.73 The claimed patent
sought to solve this problem by eliminating combustion gases and con-
trolling for humidity, temperature, and airflow. 7 4 One piece of prior art-
an article-taught that certain humidity, temperature, and oxygen levels
may produce the compounds.75 Another-a Japanese patent-taught that
increased air flow reduced combustion gases and resulted in better-smell-
ing tobacco.76
A jury found the claimed patent obvious and the district court rejected
the patentee's post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law.77
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit held that the patent was nonobvious on
the ground that "the record contain[ed] no evidence suggesting a motiva-
tion to combine" the prior art references.78 In the panel's view, the article
teaching that certain humidity, temperature, and oxygen levels may pro-
duce the compounds contained only "speculative and tentative disclosure
of what 'might' or 'may' lead to" the production of the undesirable com-
pounds, and therefore did not "sufficiently direct or instruct one of skill
in this art."79 The Japanese patent teaching that increased airflow re-
duced combustion gases and resulted in better-smelling tobacco did "not
mention" the compounds and did not provide a "link between the oxygen
levels (inherent in increasing air flow)" and production of the com-
pounds.80 Neither specifically taught how to eliminate combustion
gases.8' The panel therefore upheld the patent, even though it was known
in the field that the shift from indirect-fired barns to direct-fired barns
meant that, for the first time, tobacco was exposed to combustion gases
that produced the compound. 82
KSR suggests a different outcome. The patentee "fit the teachings of
multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle" to solve a known prob-
lem.83 In particular, because it was known that combustion gases pro-
duced anaerobic conditions, which in turn produced the undesirable
compounds, it should not have mattered that neither piece of prior art
explicitly taught the elimination of combustion gases. Nor should it have
mattered that the Japanese patent teaching that increased airflow re-
duced combustion gases failed to mention the undesirable compounds. It
was already known that deficient oxygen levels produced the compounds,
and the prior art taught that increased airflow (which necessarily in-
creases oxygen levels) reduced the combustion gases that led to the unde-
sirable results. Finally, to ignore the article teaching that certain humidity,
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1368.
75. Id. at 1375.
76. Id. at 1376.
77. Id. at 1371.




82. Id. at 1367.
83. KSR, 550 U.S. at 420.
2013] 569
SMU LAW REVIEW
temperature, and oxygen levels might produce the compound simply be-
cause the article did not sufficiently direct or instruct a person of ordinary
skill is reminiscent of the rigidity that KSR rejected. Yet the Federal Cir-
cuit held to the contrary; its reasoning flowing from the requirement that
"the fact-finder must not only determine what the prior art teaches,
but .. . whether there is a motivation to combine teachings from separate
references." 8 4
No doubt the impetus for a decision like Star Scientific, as for the rigid
TSM test itself, was the desire to adhere to objective rules that provide
clear guidance in resolving obviousness questions. But faithful application
of KSR, while it would preclude insistence on any version of the TSM test
as the exclusive means of proving obviousness, does not require courts to
reject predictability altogether. Nor does a more rigid approach guaran-
tee predictability. And under the Federal Circuit's current jurisprudence,
litigants cannot readily predict when the Federal Circuit will require a
reason to combine and when it will not.8 5 Under a flexible, fact-specific
obviousness inquiry, however, additional general principles will emerge
over time from reasoned opinions, 86 just as greater clarity has arisen
when the Federal Circuit sought to implement other aspects of the KSR
decision, such as the Sakraida principle. As precedent gathers, patterns
emerge. That the Federal Circuit has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over
all obviousness cases87 should only foster the development of clear princi-
ples over time by minimizing the risk of inconsistent outcomes-that is, if
the Federal Circuit is not overly deferential to jury verdicts.88
Of course, the Federal Circuit may still look for a reason to combine
elements of the prior art. But it is one thing to do so while acknowledging
that "[tjhere is no single way to define the line between true inventive-
ness on the one hand (which is patentable) and the application of com-
mon sense and ordinary skill to solve a problem on the other hand (which
is not patentable)." 8 9 It is quite another to do so while requiring that
"some kind of motivation must be shown from some source, so that the
jury can understand why a person of ordinary skill would have thought of
either combining two or more references or modifying one to achieve the
patented method." 90 Until the former view prevails consistently in the
Federal Circuit, the full import of KSR will not be realized.
84. Star Scientific, 655 F.3d at 1374-75.
85. Compare id. at 1374-75, with Leapfrog Enters. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157,
1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
86. Harlan F. Stone, The Common Law in the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4, 6
(1936).
87. 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a) (2006); cf Scalia, supra note 64, at 1178 ("The common-law,
discretion conferring approach is ill suited, moreover, to a legal system in which the su-
preme court can review only an insignificant portion of the decided cases.").
88. See infra Part III.C.
89. Northern District of California Model Patent Jury Instructions 37 (2011), available
at http://www.cand.uscourts.gov/juryinstructions.
90. Innogenetics, N.V. v. Abbott Labs., 512 F.3d 1363, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
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B. ENGRAFTING THE FLEXIBLE TSM TEST ONTO THE
OBVIOUS-TO-TRY DOCTRINE
Another area in which the Federal Circuit has yet to give full sway to
the teachings of KSR involves the obvious-to-try doctrine. KSR revived
that previously discredited doctrine, holding that "the fact that a combi-
nation was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under § 103."91
As articulated in KSR, this method of proving obviousness is distinct
from the flexible TSM test because it does not require a reason to com-
bine prior art references in the specific manner claimed; rather, it re-
quires only a general "design need or market pressure to solve a
problem" when "there are a finite number of identified, predictable solu-
tions."92 Yet the Federal Circuit appears to have collapsed the obvious-
to-try doctrine into its flexible TSM test, undercutting the KSR Court's
recognition that these two approaches provide separate (although no
doubt partially overlapping) methods of establishing obviousness.
Initially, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that inventions that were
obvious-to-try could be obvious unless (1) the patentee had to "vary all
parameters or try each of numerous possible choices . . . where the prior
art gave either no indication of which parameters were critical or no di-
rection as to which of many possible choices is likely to be successful," or
(2) the patentee had to "explore a new technology or general approach
that seemed to be a promising field of experimentation, where the prior
art gave only general guidance as to the particular form of the claimed
invention or how to achieve it."9 3 Later, the Federal Circuit rejected the
obvious-to-try doctrine as a means for proving obviousness.94 And thus,
by the time of KSR, "[o]bvious to try ha[d] long been held not to consti-
tute obviousness." 9 5
In KSR, the Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit's holding "that
a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by showing that the com-
bination of elements was obvious to try." 9 6 It further laid out the bounda-
ries of the doctrine:
When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem
and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a
person of ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options
within his or her technical grasp. If this leads to the anticipated suc-
cess, it is likely the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill
and common sense.97
Contrary to the Federal Circuit's previous warning that "[m]ore is
needed" than a "general motivation" to try,98 KSR made clear that a gen-
91. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
92. Id.
93. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 903 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
94. See In re Deuel, 51 F.3d 1552, 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
95. KSR, 550 U.S. at 414 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
96. Id. at 421 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
97. Id.
98. In re Deuel, 51 F.3d at 1558.
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eral design need or market pressure suffices to justify an obviousness
finding when a claimed invention was obvious-to-try. 99 For this reason,
the obvious-to-try doctrine is distinct from the flexible TSM test. The lat-
ter test requires a reason to combine elements of the prior art "in the way
the claimed new invention does."1oo The obvious-to-try doctrine, by con-
trast, requires only a general design need or market pressure to solve a
known problem for which there are a finite number of identified possible
solutions. Under KSR, no distinct motivation or "reason to combine" is
needed for the ultimately successful option.
But post-KSR, the Federal Circuit has reshaped the obvious-to-try doc-
trine to be little different from the flexible TSM test itself. For example,
the court has held that the doctrine does not apply "when the inventor
would have had to try all possibilities in a field unreduced by direction of
the prior art."' 0' Certainly that may be true when the number of "all
possibilities" is vast or unknown, but there is no basis under the test ar-
ticulated in KSR for a finding of nonobviousness when there is a limited
number of possible solutions and it is predictable that one of them will
achieve the desired goal, even if the prior art does not provide guidance
about which one. Second, and even more problematic, the Federal Circuit
has held that a claimed invention cannot be obvious-to-try when "vague
prior art does not guide an inventor toward a particular solution." 0 2 The
court expressed the view that this latter limitation "expresses the same
idea as the KSR requirement that the identified solutions be 'predict-
able."" 03 But there is nothing in KSR's statement of the test suggesting
that the prior art must point to a "particular" way of solving the problem;
rather, KSR requires only that it be predictable that one of the known
options be likely to solve the problem. If the prior art points to a "partic-
ular" solution as likely to succeed, there is no need for the obvious-to-try
doctrine because the flexible TSM test itself would lead to a finding of
obviousness.
The Federal Circuit's decision in Rolls-Royce, PLC v. United Technolo-
gies Corp. illustrates this concern.104 That case involved the fan blades on
the turbine of a jet engine 05 and the known problem of shockwaves that
increase engine noise and cause inefficiencies.106 The prior art generally
taught "to sweep [fan] blades either rearward or forward" to reduce
shockwaves. 07 It also generally taught that the sweep could be varied in
three regions of the blade: the inner, the intermediate, and the outer re-
99. KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
100. Hearing Components, Inc. v. Shure, Inc., 600 F.3d 1357, 1374 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (em-
phasis added).
101. Bayer Schering Pharma AG v. Barr Labs., Inc., 575 F.3d 1341, 1347 (Fed. Cir.
2009).
102. Id.
103. Id. (quoting KSR, 550 U.S. at 421).
104. See 603 F.3d 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2010).





gions. In particular, it taught that rearward sweep in the outer region of
the blade would reduce shockwaves. 08 The patent at issue claimed a for-
ward sweep angle in the outer region of the blade.109
The Federal Circuit rejected the defendant's obvious-to-try argument
because there existed a "broad selection of choices for further investiga-
tion"-namely "any degree of sweep."110 Moreover, "the record d[id] not
show that one of ordinary skill in the art would have any reason to try
forward sweep in the outer region at all."11'
That mode of analysis, however, appears to have unduly constrained
the application of the obvious-to-try doctrine by failing to define cor-
rectly the limited number of known options at issue. Indeed, as the Fed-
eral Circuit observed, there are many possible angles of sweep.112 But
neither the claimed invention nor the prior art was so specific. Both dis-
cussed rearward and forward sweep generally, not a specific angle of ei-
ther. Thus, in terms of the invention claimed in the patent, the available
options were finite and few: sweep could vary in three regions (the outer,
inner, and intermediate) and in two directions (rearward and forward).
Further, there was a known problem in the field: the inefficiency and
noise caused by shockwaves. Under the obvious-to-try test as enunciated
in KSR, the general design needs and market pressures to solve that
problem should have sufficed even if there was no specific reason in the
prior art to try the specific option of forward sweep in the outer region.
C. OBVIOUSNESS AS A QUESTION OF LAW
It can also be argued that the Federal Circuit has not yet implemented
a significant procedural implication of the KSR decision. KSR reiterated
that "[t]he ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination.""13
Yet Federal Circuit precedent has undermined the legal nature of the ob-
viousness inquiry in two ways: (1) by treating the reason to combine as a
factual question, and (2) by validating the practice of submitting the ulti-
mate issue of obviousness to juries and then simply inferring that all nec-
essary factual findings to support the jury's verdict were made. On both
of these points, the Federal Circuit has adhered to precedent predating
KSR. Although KSR did not expressly address or reject these practices,
its analysis and reiteration of the need to treat obviousness as a question
of law undermines the foundation upon which they originally rested.
1. Treating the Reason to Combine as a Question of Fact
In KSR, the Supreme Court stated that when "the content of the prior
art, the scope of the patent claim, and the level of ordinary skill in the art
108. Id. at 1329.
109. Id. at 1338-39.
110. Id. at 1339.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1327 ("The sweep angle measures the degree of sweep in a blade.").
113. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 50 U.S. 398, 427 (2007).
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are not in material dispute, and the obviousness of the claim is apparent
in light of these factors, summary judgment is appropriate."114 In holding
that obviousness is a question of law for the court, KSR further stressed
that a court's analysis "should be made explicit" in order "[t]o facilitate
review.""l5 Only with such explicit analysis can parties glean guidance on
the question of obviousness.116
Prior to KSR, the Federal Circuit treated the existence of a teaching,
suggestion, or motivation to combine prior art elements as a question of
fact. It did so because it viewed the question "conceptually as a subset of
the first Graham factor, the scope and content of the prior art."11 7 Ac-
cording to the Federal Circuit, "KSR did not change this rule."" 8 Conse-
quently, "[wihat a particular reference discloses is a question of fact, as is
the question of whether there was a reason to combine certain
references."" 9
In treating the existence of a reason to combine as a factual question,
the Federal Circuit arguably fails to give full effect to KSR, which (along
with Graham) after all, set out the following factual questions that if dis-
puted give rise to a need for a factfinder to resolve the dispute: "the scope
and content of the prior art"; "differences between the prior art and the
claims at issue"; "the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art"; and
"[s]uch secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but un-
solved needs, failure of others, etc." 120 Beyond that, KSR confirms that
the "ultimate judgment of obviousness is a legal determination."121 But
the Federal Circuit has effectively added another-and frequently dispos-
itive-"fact" issue to the list, therefore drastically limiting the number of
cases in which obviousness can be resolved by the court as a matter of
law.
The Federal Circuit's rationale for doing so is difficult to reconcile with
KSR. Considering the reason to combine as a subset of the scope and
content of the prior art makes some sense under a rigid TSM test where
the reason to combine must be located in the prior art. But when the
reason to combine can come from such general notions as common sense,
ordinary creativity, design trends, and market forces, it bears little resem-
blance to the sort of factual inquiry fit for a jury or for the court as
factfinder.
Note the consequence when the Federal Circuit both requires a reason
to combine and treats the question as one of fact: it essentially transforms
the ultimate legal question of obviousness into a question of fact, with the
114. Id.
115. Id. at 418.
116. See id. at 417-18 ("Following these principles may be more difficult in other cases
than it is here .... To facilitate review, this analysis should be made explicit.").
117. McGinley v. Franklin Sports, Inc., 262 F.3d 1339, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
118. Wyers v. Master Lock Co., 616 F.3d 1231, 1239 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
119. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors USA, Inc.,
617 F.3d 1296, 1303 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
120. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966).
121. KSR, 550 U.S. at 427.
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jury resolving the dispositive issue in most cases. In effect, this approach
hands the determination of obviousness to the jury, substantially under-
mining the Supreme Court's insistence in KSR on treating obviousness as
a question of law. Under current law, the Federal Circuit must reverse a
district court's grant of summary judgment on obviousness whenever
there is "a genuine issue of material fact as to whether there was motiva-
tion to combine." 122 Likewise, when reviewing a motion for judgment as
a matter of law, the Federal Circuit defers to a jury's finding of a motive
to combine or lack thereof.123 The net result is that the influence of juries
over the obviousness question is greatly enhanced and the influence of
the Federal Circuit is greatly restricted-compared to what appears to
have been the Supreme Court's vision of the proper role of courts in ana-
lyzing and resolving questions of obviousness.
2. Inferring Factual Findings from General Jury Verdicts
The Federal Circuit has also adhered to its pre-KSR practice of permit-
ting district courts to submit the ultimate question of obviousness to ju-
ries and then deferring to any assumed factual findings that would tend to
support the verdict, as long as the jury could have made such a finding.
Indeed, the Federal Circuit has held that the ultimate question of obvi-
ousness may be submitted to the jury even when one party objects,
thereby depriving litigants of the ability to obtain the de novo judicial
determination of obviousness that KSR contemplates. 124 In the court's
view, "'since the answer to the legal question necessarily resolves any
disputed underlying factual issue,' the court must accept implicit factual
findings upon which the legal conclusion is based when they are sup-
ported by substantial evidence."125 Thus, from a general verdict of non-
obviousness, a court will "infer that the jury found [the patentee's]
experts to be credible and persuasive";126 "assume that, in light of the
jury's verdict, it adopted the lower level of skill";127 and "assume that it
determined there was no reason to combine the prior art references." 12 8
Of course, these are simply legal fictions; unless the jury has been ex-
plicitly asked each of these questions in the form of special interrogato-
ries, there is no way to be certain what factual issues it has resolved.
Ironically, the only certainty provided by a general jury verdict on obvi-
ousness is that the jury has resolved an ultimate question of law one way
or the other-an issue as to which the jury is most assuredly not entitled
122. Commonwealth Scientific & Indus. Research Org. v. Buffalo Tech., Inc. (USA),
542 F.3d 1363, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
123. See, e.g., Kinetic Concepts, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 688 F.3d 1342, 1367 (Fed.
Cir. 2012); i4i Ltd. P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 831, 846 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
124. See Kinetic Concepts, 688 F.3d at 1353 ("[T]he district court denied S & N's re-
quest that it not submit the ultimate question of obviousness to the jury.").
125. Id. at 1359 (quoting Quaker City Gear Works, Inc. v. Skil Corp., 747 F.2d 1446,
1453 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
126. Id. at 1362.
127. Id. at 1366.
128. Id. at 1367.
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to deference. Whatever may have been the case under the pre-KSR rigid
TSM test, the flexible inquiry contemplated by KSR is ill-suited to the
deferential approach still being employed by the Federal Circuit. Under a
properly flexible inquiry, many possible mixes of factual findings could
produce a jury verdict. The jury, for instance, may have agreed with the
defendant on the level of ordinary skill, but agreed with the plaintiff
about the degree of difference between the claims and the prior art. Or it
may have agreed with the plaintiff on the content and scope of the prior
art, but found that secondary considerations warranted a verdict for the
defendant. Blindly assuming that the jury made all possible findings in
support of its verdict renders the Federal Circuit incapable of performing
its role of rigorously policing and defining the contours of the law of
obviousness.
Moreover, jury instructions vary.129 One version of the model instruc-
tion for obviousness in the Northern District of California states that
"[t]here is no single way to define the line between true inventiveness on
the one hand (which is patentable) and the application of common sense
and ordinary skill to solve a problem on the other hand (which is not
patentable)."o3 0 It goes on to provide that "you may consider whether
[the alleged infringer] has identified a reason that would have prompted a
person of ordinary skill to combine the elements or concepts from the
prior art in the same way as the claimed invention." 131 Is there any basis
to infer that a jury that returns a verdict of obviousness after receiving
such instructions necessarily found a reason to combine? To assume that
general jury verdicts on the ultimate question of obviousness necessarily
embody particular factual findings systematically overstates the scope of
the jury verdict and inappropriately constrains the role of the courts in
answering what is supposed to be a question of law.
The inevitable result skews judicial review of jury obviousness determi-
nations in favor of affirmance. At a minimum, the Federal Circuit's prac-
tice of deferring to assumed jury findings has transferred primary
responsibility for determining obviousness to juries and has effectively
transformed de novo review of obviousness questions into something
more deferential. This transfer blunts the notion that obviousness is a
question of law for the court. The point is particularly pronounced when
the Federal Circuit requires a motivation to combine. In i4i Limited Part-
nership v. Microsoft Corp., for example, the Federal Circuit concluded
that "[t]he jury found all of the asserted claims not invalid, meaning the
jury must have believed that there were differences between the prior art
and asserted claims, and that a person of ordinary skill would not have
been motivated to combine the references."1 3 2 As a practical matter,
whether or not the claimed invention was obvious turned on neither a
129. R.R. Dynamics, Inc. v. A. Stucki Co., 727 F.2d 1506, 1515-16 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
130. Northern District of California Model Patent Jury Instructions, supra note 89, at
37.
131. Id. (emphasis added).
132. 598 F.3d 831, 846 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
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legal determination by the court nor on an express factual finding by the
jury, but on an assumed finding that the jury may or may not have made.
This transfer of authority from judge to jury disables meaningful judi-
cial review, which in turn undermines the very uniformity and predictabil-
ity that the Federal Circuit was created to achieve and has long sought to
foster. Congress vested the Federal Circuit with exclusive appellate juris-
diction over patent cases precisely "for the sake of such desirable uni-
formity."133 But when the Federal Circuit cedes that jurisdiction by
deferring to general jury verdicts on the question of obviousness, it dis-
serves uniformity and undermines the coherent development and careful
explication of the law. Therefore, the promise of KSR has yet to be fully
realized in this respect as well.
IV. CONCLUSION
To its credit, the Federal Circuit has done much to implement and en-
force KSR's modifications to the law of obviousness. But in a few re-
spects, the court still clings to the vestiges of its pre-KSR case-law to a
greater extent than KSR seems to require. In particular, by sometimes
requiring application of its flexible TSM test, engrafting its flexible TSM
test onto the distinct obvious-to-try doctrine, treating the existence of a
reason to combine as a factual question, and allowing submission of the
ultimate question of obviousness to juries and then deferring to assumed
factual findings that would support the verdict, the Federal Circuit has
fallen short of a full-fledged adoption of KSR's reasoning and
implications.
As discussed, some observers have commented on a clash of cultures
between the Supreme Court, which deals with "majestic cases" and "bal-
ances . . . grand principles," and the Federal Circuit, which resolves run-
of-the-mill commercial disputes where "predictable . . . [b]right line
rule[s]" are desirable to guide parties.134 But it is open to question
whether the divergences from KSR that are discussed above can be ex-
plained by that theory. It is far from clear that the flexible TSM test as
now applied by the Federal Circuit offers predictability or clear guidance.
The court's endorsement of general jury verdicts and deference to as-
sumed factual findings turns obviousness disputes over to lay juries,
which are predictable only in the sense that they tend on average to err in
favor of patentees.135 Substantive flexibility coupled with rigorous appel-
late review by the Federal Circuit would do more to advance the goals of
uniformity and predictability in the long run.
133. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 390 (1996).
134. Quinn, supra note 4.
135. See Kimberly A. Moore, Juries, Patent Cases, & A Lack of Transparency, 39 Hous.
L. REV. 779, 780 (2002) ("[J]uries are more likely than judges to find for the patent holder
and more likely to hold a patent valid, infringed, and willfully infringed."); Amy Tindell,
Toward a More Reliable Fact-Finder in Patent Litigation, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PRop. L. REV.
309, 320 (2009) ("[A]n outcome of validity is significantly more likely with a jury.").
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Nor is it apparent that a general aversion to formalism fueled the deci-
sion in KSR. Certainly it cannot be said that all of the Justices who joined
the KSR decision share a dislike for bright-line rules.136 It seems at least
equally possible that other concerns motivated at least some of the Jus-
tices, including, in particular, a desire to avoid the costs associated with
overprotection of patent rights. As Justice Kennedy explained for the
Court, "Granting patent protection to advances that would occur in the
ordinary course without real innovation retards progress." 3 7 When it
comes to the issue of obviousness, correct outcomes may be more impor-
tant than the certainty gained by "imperfect generalizations"1 38-espe-
cially when those generalizations tip the balance in favor of patent
protection for non-innovative inventions.
Fundamentally, however, our examination of the Federal Circuit's re-
action to the KSR decision reveals a court laboring in good faith to imple-
ment the dictates of that ruling, regardless of possibly differing
perspectives regarding the proper balance between bright-line rules and
judicial flexibility. While it is sometimes tempting to frame the Federal
Circuit's relationship with the Supreme Court as a strained or difficult
one, this case study suggests that the reality is much more mundane. The
Supreme Court has provided guidance regarding certain patent law doc-
trines, just as it does in numerous other areas of federal law, and the
Federal Circuit is in the process of working out the details of that gui-
dance. Indeed, far from suggesting a lack of confidence in the Federal
Circuit's willingness to implement its pronouncements, the thrust of the
KSR decision was to increase the role and flexibility of the Federal Cir-
cuit in enunciating the contours of the law of obviousness, thereby dem-
onstrating the Supreme Court's trust and expectation that the Federal
Circuit will generally exercise that flexibility appropriately. In its imple-
mentation of the KSR decision, the Federal Circuit has done much to
show that the Court's trust is warranted. But there is still more work to be
done.
136. See Scalia, supra note 64, at 1173.
137. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007).
138. Scalia, supra note 64, at 1177.
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